The central bank had previously estimated 4.9% inflation for the end of 2024 and 3.5% for the end of 2025.

The decrease would be further driven primarily by supply-side factors, whose disinflationary action would continue to be stronger over the short term than previously anticipated, amid disinflationary base effects and the influences from legislative changes in the energy sector implemented as of April.

The National Bank of Romania Board members also noted that disinflationary base effects would mainly materialize in the non-food sub-components of core inflation, as well as in the growth rates of administered prices and fuel prices, while small opposite base effects would affect in the near run the dynamics of processed food prices, which would thus see a turning point in the third quarter of 2024, also under the influence of the trend reversal in some agri-food commodity prices.

However, significant uncertainties were associated with future movements in energy and food prices amid the legislative changes and the protracted drought this year, as well as with the prospective evolution of crude oil and other commodity prices in view of heightening geopolitical tensions, Board members stressed.

At the same time, it was noted that underlying inflationary pressures were expected to persist over the entire forecast horizon and to ease only slightly compared to the first part of this year and the former forecast, given that, following a meagre contraction in the second half of 2024, excess demand would likely quasi-stabilize over the next six quarters, at a significant level, marginally lower than priorly foreseen.

Moreover, the double-digit annual dynamics of unit labor costs in the private sector were anticipated to further climb this year as a whole and thus exceed the slightly lower previously projected level.

Nevertheless, core inflation would also capture the increasingly significant influences of disinflationary base effects anticipated to emerge in the non-food and services segments, which would outweigh by far the opposite influences stemming in the near run from the processed food price dynamics. Furthermore, increasing disinflationary effects over the entire forecast horizon were expected from the deceleration in import price growth, but especially from the decline in short-term inflation expectations, at a somewhat faster pace than in the prior projection.

Under these conditions, the annual adjusted CORE2 inflation rate would probably continue to decline at a faster tempo than headline inflation, on a steeper-than-previously-anticipated path. Specifically, it was seen falling to 4.6% in December 2024, 3.5% in the closing month of 2025 and 3.4% at the end of the projection horizon, compared with 5.3%, 3.7% and 3.5% respectively, as indicated in the prior forecast for the same reference.

As for the future cyclical position of the economy, Board members discussed the prospects for economic activity, showing that it was foreseen to gather momentum in 2024 and 2025 overall, albeit at a somewhat slower pace than envisaged before. That was anticipated to occur amid the slowdown in inflation and the gradual recovery of external demand, but especially under the impact of the fiscal policy stance and the use of EU funds under the Next Generation EU instrument.

It was noted that, similarly to previous forecasts, household consumption was anticipated to become again in 2024 and remain in 2025 the main driver of GDP advance, amid the marked pick-up in real disposable income growth – due to increases in wages and social transfers overlapping the relatively lower inflation rate downtrend –, but also given the real interest rates on household loans and deposits.

A sizeable contribution to the GDP dynamics would also probably come from the gross fixed capital formation again. However, its growth rate was seen slowing down considerably in 2024-2025 after the swift pick-up in 2023, but remaining fast from a historical perspective, amid the absorption and use of a large volume of EU funds. The decline in GFCF growth versus 2023 was expected, inter alia, in the context of significant uncertainties associated with budget programs and executions, as well as geopolitical tensions and economic developments across Europe, Board members noted.

The contribution of net exports was foreseen to become again and remain more contractionary in 2024 and 2025 than previously anticipated, amid the prospects of a relatively brisker rise in the dynamics of the import volume of goods and services, coupled with the differential between the rate of change of domestic absorption and that of external demand.

Against that background, the current account deficit-to-GDP ratio would probably halt its downward correction in 2024-2025 and hence stay well above European standards, remaining a major vulnerability and inducing risks to inflation, the sovereign risk premium and, ultimately, to economic growth sustainability, Board members underlined.